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Abstract
This paper combines an economic experiment with survey data to investigate
determinants of trust and trustworthiness in the Dutch society. We contrast the
inferences which can be made on the trust propensity using stated and revealed
measures and we test for participation bias in our experiment. We find that
middle aged and educated individuals trust relatively more but are relatively
less trustworthy. The effect of age and religion on trust is shown to depend
heavily on whether experimental or survey trust measures are used. We find no
evidence of participation bias in any experimental decisions.
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1 Introduction
It is increasingly argued that a nation’s social capital can influence its economic per-
formance. Although there is an ongoing debate over what constitutes social capital
(Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Durlauf 2002), there seems to be a consensus that both
average societal trust and trustworthiness are two important components. The trans-
actions cost paradigm remains the traditional way of thinking about the mechanism
by which both these components of social capital affect economic performance. When
societal trust and trustworthiness levels are high, transactions costs are low which
makes organizations and governments more efficient which ultimately leads to better
economic performance.
The research on social capital started with the influential work of Putnam (1993)
who found a strong correlation between measures of civic engagement and government
quality across regions in Italy. The association of social capital with growth started
with the work of Knack and Keefer (1997), and Zak and Knack (2001) who find that a
one-standard deviation increase in the World-Value Survey (WVS) trust index increases
economic growth by more than one-half of a standard deviation. La Porta, de Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) find that across countries, a one-standard deviation increase
in the same measure of trust increases judicial efficiency by 0.7 of a standard deviation
and reduces government corruption by 0.3 of a standard deviation. These empirical
facts rest on the WVS trust index constructed by drawing in each participating country
a random sample of participants who are asked to answer, amongst others, the following
question
WVS trust question Generally speaking would you say that most people can be
trusted or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?
1.) Most people can be trusted.
2.) You have to be very careful.
3.) I do not know.
The WVS reports for each country the percentage of responders who indicated that
”Most people can be trusted”.
2
Because of the strong correlation between measures of social capital and economic
growth, and since age and income distributions of many Western societies are pre-
dicted to evolve over time in very alarming ways (Gruber and Wise, 2001; Gottschalk
and Smeeding, 1997), it becomes relevant for policy makers to investigate how average
trust and trustworthiness in their population are shifted as a result of changes in age,
education, income, and past life experiences of individuals. To perform these measure-
ments, two essential features must be combined: 1) to have a random sample drawn
from a country’s population, and 2) being able to measure trust and trustworthiness
with little error. The motivation for the first condition follows from the law of large
numbers, whereas sample average trust and trustworthiness are consistent estimates
of their population counterparts. The second requirement follows from the fact that
the estimated parameters we make inferences on will, in general, be biased if trust and
trustworthiness are measured with error (Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz, 2001).
The empirical literature has up to now been unable to meet both requirements
simultaneously. The empirical methods employed so far to analyze individual trust
are survey questionnaires and economic experiments. Alesina and La Ferrara (2002)
use answers to the WVS trust question to investigate determinants of trust in the
United States. The main advantage of their approach is it allows to make population
inferences by observing the behavior of a randomly drawn sample of individuals from
that population. The main drawback is that researchers run the risk of collecting
answers to a vague and hypothetical question which can create a discrepancy between
someone’s answers and his actual behavior. Thus, part of the variation in responses may
be attributed to differences in interpreting who compromises ”most people”, differences
in what is meant to trust someone etc. Moreover, variations in response may also arise
because individuals do not answer truthfully to the question.
Economic experiments have the virtue of countering the effects associated with
survey data by observing the actual behavior of individuals placed in a context which
is under experimental control. These experiments offer an attractive alternative to
surveys, given one can design an experiment which captures the essential features
of trust and trustworthiness which are of interest. The seminal experiment of Berg,
Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) (hereafter BDMc) remains today the main experimental
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design used to test for the presence of trust and trustworthiness (more details on the
game are given later). The general results of the BDMc game are that people place trust
in others, but it is ambiguous whether or not this trust pays. These results have since
been shown to be robust to several framing effects (Ortmann, Fitzgerald, and Boeing,
2000) and role reversals (Burks, Carpenter, and Verhoogen, 2003). The main drawback
of these types of experiments is that subjects are generally drawn from homogenous
pools of university students. These subjects lack the required variation in background
characteristics to measure how these variables influence trust and trustworthiness.
The analysis of determinants of trustworthiness is even less documented than trust
and relies mostly on analyzing responders’ behavior in trust games such as the BDMc
game. Hence, this form of analysis suffers from the same drawbacks outlined above.
Our little knowledge of the determinants of trustworthiness at the population level is
source of concern as recent research has argued that trustworthiness could be ”the” eco-
nomically relevant component of social capital to understand the process of economic
development (Francois and Zabojnik, 2002).
This paper makes three important contributions. First, we combine the strengths
of survey and experimental methods in a straightforward way by having a random
sample of the Dutch population play a computerized version of the BDMc trust game.
This allows us to touch on several related issues. First and foremost, we add to the
scarce body of knowledge on determinants of trust and trustworthiness by estimating
age, education, and other life experience effects from experimental trust responses.
The key results are that the age and education level of subjects influence trust and
trustworthiness in very different ways. Specifically, we find that there is an inverted U
shape relation between trust and education, and trust and age, while both relationships
are U shaped with respect to trustworthiness. The later finding contrasts with some of
the existing relationships found in the social capital literature. The second advantage of
combining survey and experimental methods is that we are able to test the assumption
of parallelism between the lab and the field. Up till now, this assumption has generally
been tested with newspaper experiments (e.g., see Bosch-Dome`nech, Montalvo, Nagel,
and Satorra (2002) for a survey of newspaper experiments) and internet experiments
(e.g., Lucking-Reiley, 1999). Because newspaper readers or internet users are not
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generally representative of a nation’s population, these mediums prevent population
inferences which are the primary concern of our paper.1
The second contribution of the paper builds on the seminal work of Glaeser, Laib-
son, Scheinkman, and Soutter (2000) (hereafter GLSS) who, among other things, inval-
idate the use of survey trust measures on the basis that they do not predict well trust
responses in the lab. We show that the predictive power of survey trust is strongly
related to the sample used and the experimental design. The immediate consequence
of this is that experimenters can influence the predictive power of survey trust by ap-
propriately choosing subjects and experimental designs. This leads us to conclude that
the predictive power of survey trust questions is insufficient to validate or invalidate
their use. We propose a new approach to compare both trust measures, which consists
of testing whether survey and experimental approaches are equally informative on the
determinants of trust. Our evidence shows that the effect of some background charac-
teristics, especially religion and education, can change dramatically when using stated
rather than experimental trust responses.
Finally, by giving our subjects the choice to participate and by observing the char-
acteristics of those who refuse to do so, we are in the unique position to test for
participation bias in our experiment. If participants have for example above average
taste for gambling and risk, or higher cognitive abilities than non-participants, and
these unobservable attributes are correlated with the outcomes that are measured in
the lab, a participation bias will be present. Because experiments typically do not
observe non-participants, tests of participation bias in experiments are very limited.
Eckel and Grossman (2000) find some evidence on the presence of participation bias in
a classroom experiment by comparing responses of student volunteers and ”pseudo”-
volunteers. Their results are specific to the game they use (a dictator game) and hold
1Three noteworthy experiments have recently been run with representative samples. Harrison, Lau,
and Williams (2002) use a random sample of the Danish population to investigate the heterogeneity in
individual discount rates. Hey (2002) used the CentERpanel of Tilburg University (more on this panel
later on) to have a random sample of the Dutch population play an experiment on decision making
under risk and uncertainty. Fehr, Fischbacher, Rosenbladt, Schupp, and Wagner (2002) report about a
”preliminary analysis” of a ”first implementation” of an interview based trust game with the German
Socio-Economic Panel.
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only for student populations. In this paper we provide the first full fledge test of partic-
ipation bias in experimental economics. We do not find any evidence suggesting that
the trust and trustworthiness behavior of participants in our experiment differ in any
way from that of randomly selected subjects.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the design
of the experiment, the experimental procedure, and our sample. Section 3 discusses
the empirical results on trust. Findings on trustworthiness are presented in section 4.
Section 5 reports results for participation bias while section 6 discusses and concludes.
2 The experimental design and the sample
The recruitment of our subjects was made by CentERdata, the survey research institute
of Tilburg University in the Netherlands. The main activity of CentERdata is to
manage and carry out panel surveys through a telepanel: the CentERpanel (hereafter
CP), consisting of approximately 2000 representative Dutch households. Every Friday,
CP’s household members receive a questionnaire which they are asked to fill in at any
time between Friday and Tuesday of the following week. This questionnaire is filled
at home either on a computer or on a television set which is connected to a set-up
box linking the household to the CentERdata server. In order to keep the sample
representative of the Dutch population, low income households without a computer
or a television set are given the necessary equipment in order to complete the weekly
questionnaire.2
There are many reasons why the CP is an attractive medium to conduct experi-
ments. First, it gives us access to a representative sample of a population, which is the
key feature of this study. Second, because participants answer questions on a computer
or a television set, we are able to replicate as closely as possible the environment of
a laboratory experiment, which simplifies comparisons of our results with those of the
2For a description of the recruitment, sampling methods, and past usages of the CentERpanel see:
www.centerdata.nl . Children below 16 years of age as well as immigrants are excluded from the
panel. The latter for the reason being that their language proficiency in Dutch makes it difficult for
them to answer the questions on a weekly basis.
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existing literature. Third, because participants communicate with CentERdata, the
experiment is double blind as participants were told that they will be anonymously
matched and that their identities would not be revealed to the experimenters. Finally,
as CentERdata reimburses the weekly telephone costs for answering the questionnaire
by crediting CentERpoints to their private bank accounts four times a year, our par-
ticipants are already familiar to payment in fictitious currency.3 This allows us to use
CentERpoints as the experimental currency unit and reimburse our participants in a
very convenient way.
Our design closely follows BDMc.4 A sender5 S and a responder R were both
endowed with 500 CentERpoints. S could send money to R from his endowment. We
discretized the choice set of S to 11 amounts yE ∈ {0, 50, ..., 450, 500}. The amount S
sent was doubled by the experimenters and added to R’s endowment. We measured
responses using the strategy method by which R was asked to return an amount to S,
contingent on each of the 11 possible amounts he might receive from S. The response
which corresponded to the actual decision of S was chosen to be the effective action and
determined the payoff of both participants. After all participants made their decisions,
S and R players were randomly matched and payoffs were computed based on the
decisions of the pair. The final payoffs were computed as follows: S received the initial
500 CentERpoints reduced by the amount sent yE plus the amount received from R,
while R received his initial endowment of 500 CentERpoints, the amount sent by S
multiplied by 2 minus the amount returned to S.
The strategy method was chosen to overcome the difficulty of having CP members
play together in real time. This method has several additional advantages. First, it
facilitates data acquisition as the complete strategy plan for all 11 possible amounts
received is elicited. Second, as our game may seem complex to some subjects, the
strategy method requires that people thoroughly familiarize themselves with the ram-
3The exchange rate is 1 CentERpoint = 0.01 Euro.
4Computer screens of the original experiment (in Dutch) are available upon request. The translated
text of all screens are enclosed in appendix B.
5For ease of reading we keep the terms ”sender” and ”responder” for the different roles. In the
experiment we omitted suggestive labels and referred to the person itself or to his opponent as ”the
matched panel member.”
7
ifications of all choices, so that we do not retrieve data from uninformed subjects.6
Under the assumption that both players maximize their monetary payoffs, the Nash
equilibrium of the game is for S to send nothing to R, as R’s dominant strategy is to re-
turn nothing to S. Hence, observing increasing positive amounts sent is interpreted as
evidence that people increasingly trust others. Likewise, observing increasing amounts
returned is taken as evidence of the existence of increasing trustworthiness. It is impor-
tant to stress that repeated game effects, retaliation strategies, and game experience
effects are deliberately excluded by our experimental design. Thus, one can think of
the current design as measuring the basic trust propensity of an individual at a given
point in time.7
S and R were additionally asked to state their beliefs about their partners’ action.
These questions were asked after both players made their decisions in order to cir-
cumvent the possibility that belief elicitation induces non-cooperative behavior when
asked before the play of the game (Croson, 2000). We elicit senders’ beliefs with two
questions. The first question asks to state how much they think R will return to them.
The second question asks them to state what they think the average S player will send.
The latter question is intended to capture behavior directed towards some social norm.
Responders on the other hand simply had to state how much units they thought of
receiving from senders. This concluded the experimental part of the session.
All players were then asked to answer two survey questions. The first question
asked players to state their average experience with trust
Lifetime trust experience question In the past, when you trusted someone, was
your trust usually rewarded or usually exploited?
(Always rewarded) 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 (Always exploited).
6There is weak evidence suggesting that a hot environment triggers stronger responses in two player
games. Brandts and Charness (2000) find that the strategy method and the hot environment do not
yield significant different responses in two simple sequential two player games.
7Results from repeated trust experiments can be found in Anderhub, Engelmann, and Gu¨th (1999)
and Willinger, Keser, Lohmann, and Usunier (2003).
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This question will be used to test for the presence of state dependent behavior
whereby differences in past experiences with trust may lead to different experimental
decisions.
The second question was the WVS trust question presented in the introduction.
This question will allow us to compare the inferences on trust which can be made using
stated and revealed decisions. Contrary to GLSS, our subjects answered the WVS
trust question after having made their experimental decisions. This has the benefit
of not framing the experimental decision as one involving trust. The disadvantage
is that answers to the WVS trust question may be influenced by the experimental
decisions which were made before, which would complicate the comparisons of our
experimental and survey trust measures. In the next section, we develop a simple
econometric model which allows to test for the presence of misreported answers to the
WVS trust question, and examines to which extent misreporting was influenced by the
experimental decision. As will be shown, we do not find evidence suggesting that our
sequence of tasks influenced answers to the WVS question.
Two weeks after the experiment, each participant received feedback information
on the outcome of the game and their final payoff which was later credited to their
CentER bank accounts. The experiment was conducted in two sessions, in the 31st
and the 36th weeks of the calendar year 2002. Individuals contacted had to read an
opening screen informing them that they were selected to participate in an experiment
conducted jointly by a team of university researchers. A detailed description of the
game followed with the mode of payments. Each person was informed that conditional
on their participation, they would be randomly matched to one of the roles. The role
was revealed to panel members once they had agreed to participate. We contacted 541
panel members from which 42 declined to participate.8 Of the 499 panel members who
completed the experiment, 276 were S players and 223 were R players.
Table 1 gives the description of the variables and descriptive statistics of the 541
household members contacted for senders, receivers and non-participants. The means
814 non-participants initially accepted to play but eventually backed out of the experiment after
having observed the roles they were assigned to play. It is interesting to note that 11 out of those 14
panel members were assigned to the role of responders.
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of most variables are relatively identical across non-participants, senders, and respon-
ders. 63.7% of the persons contacted were heads of households and most players either
had a secondary or vocational training degree. Catholics and protestants are the two
most important religious communities in the sample and their relative weights in the
three participation categories are very similar. Two notable differences across the
three groups concern work propensity and age. Non-participants are on average 10
years older than both senders and responders. This age effect is also reflected in a
higher labor market retirement frequency and lower labor work participation.
Despite all the advantages of using the CP, one limitation is that panel members
were not constrained to complete the experiment in a limited amount of time, giving
them the opportunity to seek advice in order to make more informed choices. As a
result, a high game time would be an indication of collective decision making. Cen-
tERdata keeps track of the time taken to complete the questionnaires from the time
subjects log in the CentERdata network. Table 1 also displays some statistics on
completion times for both types of players and non-participants. As expected, non-
participants have the lowest participation time in the experiment, with a median time
slightly greater than a minute. The median time taken by R players is greater than
that by S players, a result primarily due to the fact that R players made their deci-
sions using the time-intensive strategy method. Since the majority of subjects took less
than 10 minutes to complete the experiment, it seems unlikely that collective decision
making is present in the data.
3 Results on Trust
The distribution of amounts sent in the experiment is shown in figure 1. The two
distinctive features of this distribution are 1) the majority of subjects send positive
amounts 2) the distribution is heavily skewed to the left, with a mode at 5, the equal
split category. The shape of this distribution is familiar to that usually found in lab-
experiments with student samples (BDMc; Ortmann, Fitzgerald, and Boeing, 2000)
but differs greatly from that of GLSS, which was heavily skewed to the right, with
most subjects sending the maximal possible amount. We will try to reconcile the
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differences between GLSS and our data below.
We assume that senders have a continuous unobserved latent trust propensity T ∗i .
This propensity is heterogeneously distributed in the population according to
T ∗i = x
t′
i β + ε
t
i (1)
where xti is a vector of observed characteristics of sender i, β is a vector of unknown
slope parameters, and εi is a random term capturing unobserved heterogeneity across
individuals. Our experimental trust measure yEi is ordinal and discrete. The ordered
probit model is adequate to analyze this type of data (Maddala, 1983). However,
the ordered probit model requires a sufficient amount of observations in each discrete
category to estimate nuisance threshold parameters. As can be seen from figure 1,
categories 300 to 450 CentERpoints have very little observations. In our empirical
application, we merge these categories and estimate an ordered probit model with
eight categories.
The first 2 specifications of table 2 present ordered probit regressions. The first
specification uses as regressors a standard set of background characteristics supple-
mented by reported life experience with trust (TRUSTEXP), subjects’ beliefs about
the amount they expect to be returned to them (STHINK), and the average amount
they expect other senders will send (SMEANS). The second specification omits beliefs.9
In both specifications, we do not find gender of subjects to influence trust. This
contrasts with the earlier findings in the social capital literature which showed that
women are less involved in organizations (Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote, 2002) and
that women trust less than men (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000). We also find that
family size, whether an individual is retired from the labor force or is not working do
not correlate with trust.
The estimated age effect is robust and of similar magnitude across both specifi-
cations. Both age parameters are significant. Based on specification 1 and holding
other factors constant, trust is seen to increase until the age of 30, beyond which it
9We have experimented with a specification including cross-terms but none was found to be sta-
tistically significant.
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starts to decline. This reconfirms the inverted-U shape pattern usually found in the so-
cial capital literature (Putnam, 2000; Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote, 2002) although
those studies report that social capital reaches a high at 45 years of age. Education
also has an inverted-U profile. We find that individuals with secondary and technical
training are more likely to trust than subjects with either low education levels (the
omitted category) and subjects with university degrees. Comparisons of specification
1 with specification 2 show that the education relationship is also robust to inclusions
of beliefs. Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002) find a positive relation between edu-
cation and organizational membership but do not report results which would indicate
the presence of non-linearities. Subjects’ religious beliefs were classified in three cate-
gories, protestants, catholics, and atheists. We find no evidence that either catholics or
protestants trust differently than atheists (the omitted category), which squares with
results found by Alesina and La Ferrara (2002).
Both belief variables, STHINK and SMEANS, have positive effects on trust and
are highly significant. These results indicate that senders who expected to receive
more sent more, and senders who thought other senders would send more increased
their amount sent. The former result captures expectations of the subjects.10 The
latter result can be interpreted as a social norm as individuals tend to partly emulate
what they expect others to do. In order to asses the contribution of beliefs to the
empirical model, we computed a likelihood-ratio test comparing specifications 1 and 2.
The test value of 232.12 (5% χ2 critical value of 5.99) indicates that apart from being
statistically significant, beliefs substantially improve the predictive fit of the model.
Finally, we asked subjects to report their lifetime experience with trust. This was
done to investigate whether a form of state dependance existed, whereas an individual
who is dissatisfied with his experiences with trust is less likely to trust in the experi-
ment.11 Our results show that the state of trust individuals preceive themselves to be
10It has been argued that the causality may be in the opposite direction (Selten and Ockenfels,
1998, p. 526-529). We do not investigate these issues in this paper.
11This definition of state dependance differs from that used in labor economics. Labor economists
are generally interested in whether or not individuals in a state of unemployment are more likely to
be unemployed in the future. In our experiment, we do not investigate whether having trusted in the
past increases the likelihood of trusting in the experiment.
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in does not significantly correlate with experimental trust.
3.1 Comparing experimental and survey trust measures
In this section, we sequentially address the following questions: 1) Do answers to the
WVS trust question predict well experimental trust? 2) Do survey and experimental
trust measures provide the same information on the determinants of trust? It is im-
portant to stress that both questions are complementary. The first question is relevant
if we are interested in predicting experimental trust responses. However, it leaves open
the reasons of what drives the possible correlation between both variables. The second
question asks whether we can extract the same information from both set of measures.
3.1.1 Prediction
The question of whether or not answers to the WVS trust question predict experimental
trust has been addressed by GLSS. Running a linear regression of experimental trust
of answers to the WVS trust question and a set of covariates, they find that answers
to the WVS do not significantly explain their experimental trust outcomes. The main
explanations given for this result are that the WVS question is vague, hypothetical, and
likely to be misreported. To investigate which of these explanations is more relevant, we
first follow GLSS by adding answers to the WVS trust question (WVS) as a regressor
in our experimental trust equation. This corresponds to specification 3 of table 2.
Contrary to GLSS, we find that answers to the WVS trust question do significantly
explain experimental trust. Furthermore, all other parameter estimates of the model
are robust to the inclusion of this variable.
How can we rationalize the finding that answers to the WVS trust question pre-
dicts well our experimental trust and not that of GLSS? In our view, the two elements
explaining the differences between both studies are the amount of background informa-
tion on subjects which is available, and differences in experimental designs. The role
of each of these factors can be better understood by analyzing the following system of
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linear equations12
yEi = x
t′
i β
E + ξyWV Si + ε
E
i (2)
yWV Si = x
t′
i β
WV S + εWV Si (3)
Equation (2) is the linear version of equation (1), where yWV Si denotes answers to the
WVS question, εEi captures the unobserved determinants of experimental trust and
ξ measures the predictive power of answers to the survey trust question. The second
equation relates answers to the WVS trust question to xti and an unobserved component
εWV Si . It is important to point out that the result which we present below will hold in
general for any other measure or linear combination of survey trust and social capital
measures which are used as predictors. Substituting (3) in (2) and rearranging yields
yEi = x
t′
i β
E+ + ξεWV Si + ε
E
i (4)
where βE+ = βE + ξβWV S. From equation (4) we see that the value of ξ is identi-
fied from the variation between yEi and ε
WV S
i . Partialling out the covariates x
t
i , it is
straightforward to show that for the linear model, the probability limit of the estimated
predictive effect ξ̂ is
p lim ξ̂ = ξ +
(
V
(
εEi |xti
)
V (εWV Si |xti )
)1/2
Cor
(
εEi , ε
WV S
i |xti
)
(5)
where V
(
εEi |xti
)
and V
(
εEi |xti
)
are the variances of εEi and ε
WV S
i conditional on x
t
i
and Cor
(
εEi , ε
WV S
i |xti
)
denotes the correlation between both unobserved components
for a given set of covariates.
The impact of the amount of background information available and the exper-
imental design on the estimated predictive power of survey trust measures emerge
from equation (5). First, the amount of information on the characteristics of subjects
which is available to experimenters will play an important, as any omitted character-
istics remotely correlated with survey and experimental trust will be captured by εEi
12In the probit model, E (y|X = x) = Φ (x′β) is approximately linear in x′β for individuals an-
swering 1 to the WVS trust question with probability between 20% and 80% (e.g., Ruud, 2000). In
general, the average probability of answering 1 to the WVS questions lies between 45% and 55% which
implies that the linear model holds for most individuals in the sample.
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and εWV Si . The higher the number of common unobserved characteristics, the higher
Cor
(
εEi , ε
WV S
i |xti
)
will be. It is important to note that a stronger correlation will
amplify the differences in estimates of ξ̂ between studies which have different vari-
ance terms V
(
εEi |xti
)
and V
(
εWV Si |xti
)
. One such omitted factor is subjects’ history
of traumatic experiences which has been shown to be correlated with trust (Alesina
and La Fererra, 2002), but which is not observed by GLSS nor the present study. We
investigated the amount of correlation between εEi and ε
WV S
i in our data by jointly
estimating equations (2) and (3), conditioning on the set of background characteristics
corresponding to specification 4 in table 2.13 The estimated value of Cor
(
εEi , ε
WV S
i |xti
)
was 14.8%, significant at the 1% level. To get an idea of the impact an omitted variable
can have on the estimated correlation between unobserved components, we removed
lifetime experience with trust (TRUSTEXP) from the list of regressors. As conjectured,
the estimated correlation increased from 14.8% to 17.28%.14
Second, differences in experimental design will directly influence the predictive
power of survey trust measures via ξ, the common component between both trust
measures, and via V
(
εEi |xti
)
, the variance of the experimental design. The common
element shared by two trust measures ξ is expected to be higher when both measures
are tailored to capture the same type of trust. The WVS question explicitly elicits
trust towards strangers. In our experiment, senders and receivers were strangers as
their identities were never disclosed to the other party. On the other hand, subjects in
GLSS were not strangers, as their identity was deliberately revealed amongst subject
pairs in order to investigate the role of social connections.15 We suspect that the fact
that subjects new each other served as a behavioral discipline device, with subjects act-
ing more kindly than they would otherwise if paired against strangers. This may well
account for the high concentration of offers around the maximal amount sent reported
by GLSS. Because our experimental design makes us more likely to capture WVS type
trust than the experimental design of GLSS, we expect ξ to be relatively higher in our
experiment. Finally, if whether subjects knew each other or not influences the distri-
13Tables of results are available upon request.
14Additionally removing age as a regressor further increased the correlation to 18.5%.
15In GLSS, pairs either knew each other before the experiment or got to know each other by jointly
filling in a social connection survey. This survey includes among other questions to report the number
of all personal acquaintances whom they have in common.
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bution of responses, this design feature will also affect the variance term V
(
εEi |xti
)
.
Data of GLSS show that the unconditional variance in amounts sent is low, with 71%
of their senders sending the maximal amount. In our experiment, the variance in the
amount sent is much more dispersed which, from (5), implies that we should indeed
expect higher values of ξ̂.16
The framework above demonstrates that the predictive power of survey trust mea-
sures is intimately linked to the information experimenters posses on their subjects,
and the choice of the experimental design. Because most of the factors are to some
extent under the experimenters’ control, prediction is not a suitable basis to compare
experimental and survey trust. As the relevant policy exercise concerns measuring
the effect of changes in the background characteristics on trust and trustworthiness, it
seems more interesting to compare both measures on the basis of whether or not they
carry the same information on the determinants of trust. This is something on which
prediction has little to say.
3.1.2 Informational content
Measuring trust and trustworthiness using experiments is difficult when the target
group is a nation’s population. A more accessible alternative consists of surveys, which
are easily found for a handful of countries. The methodological question is whether or
not the effects of background characteristics on trust can be measured equally well using
either experimental or survey data. If the effects measured were the same, the relative
accessibility of survey measures would weaken the need for conducting experiments
with representative samples.
By observing subjects’ decisions in the trust game and their answers to the WVS
trust question, we are in the unique position to compare how different the inferences on
the determinants of trust can be when researchers use a popular survey question rather
than experimental methods to measure trust. Specification 4 in table 2 reports results
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is also likely do differ across studies according to differences in the dimension of the
choice space of players, the fictitious currency used in the experiment, the monetary endowments, the
multiplier, whether the experiment is conducted in the lab, in the classroom, at home on paper or on
a computer, and whether the strategy method is used or not.
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from a probit regression of the answers of our senders to theWVS trust question on their
background characteristics. The differences with the experimental estimates are quite
remarkable. We find that catholics and protestants trust others less than individuals
without religious beliefs. This is in sharp contrast to the results from the experimental
data where religious effects were totally absent. The second major difference concerns
the education pattern. We do not find any effect of education on survey trust while
we have found that a significant inverted-U relationship related experimental trust to
education. Another notable difference is the effect of reported lifetime experience on
trust. The effect is positive and significant when using the survey trust measure while
it has an insignificant impact on experimental trust.
Despite these differences, there are some notable similarities. The inverted-U shape
effect of age on trust remains when using survey trust. The number of children, subjects
income, gender, and work status also remain insignificant using the survey measure.
To test whether the differences across measures significantly outweigh the similar-
ities, we compare all effects simultaneously. In appendix A.1, we propose a simple
minimum distance test which compares the difference between all parameter estimates
of the probit model and the ordered probit model. We computed the test statistic
based on specifications 2 and 4 of table 2. The value of the test is 21.78, significant at
the 10 percent level. This indicates that the differences driven by the changes in the
religious and education effects are strong enough to reject the null hypothesis that the
informational content of both trust measures is identical.
3.2 Explaining differences between both measures
The preceding section has shown that effects of background characteristics on trust are
not robust to the type of measure used. We already mentioned that these differences
can be attributed to the fact that the WVS question is vague and hypothetical or that
it is misreported at the individual level. Recent developments in econometrics give
us ways to test and control for misreporting of a discrete endogenous variable. If the
difference between both experimental and survey trust measures are entirely due to
misreporting, there is scope for using the WVS question and appropriately correct for
misreporting. Furthermore, because our senders answered the survey question after
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having played the trust game, there is the possibility that senders may have given
answers to the WVS question which looked coherent with their play in the game. This
would add to the amount of misreporting in our answers to the WVS question. This
section tests for general misreporting and misreporting due to the sequence of play.
We define α10
(
yEi
)
as the probability that a subject answers 1 (”YES”) to the
WVS trust question when his truthful answer would be 0 (”NO”). This event occurs
when, for example, generous senders are more inclined to state that they trust others
rather than truthfully answering that they don’t. Similarly, we define α01
(
yEi
)
as the
probability that subject answers 0 (”NO”) to the WVS trust question when his truthful
answer would be 1 (”YES”). This probability captures events such as senders who are
more likely to state that they do not trust others when they would have answered the
opposite, had they been truthful. We allow for the fact that the amount of misreporting
may depend on the experimental decision yEi by assuming the probabilities have the
following logit form
α10
(
yEi
)
=
exp
(
θ100 + θ
10
1 y
E
i
)
exp (θ100 + θ
10
1 y
E
i ) + 1
α01
(
yEi
)
=
exp
(
θ010 + θ
01
1 y
E
i
)
exp (θ010 + θ
01
1 y
E
i ) + 1
where {θ100 , θ010 , θ101 , θ011 } are unknown parameters to be estimated. Some special cases
are of interest. If θ101 = θ
01
1 = 0 and the constant terms θ
10
0 and θ
01
0 are large, misre-
porting is random in the population of senders and is not affected by the preceding
experiment. If in addition θ100 and θ
01
0 are small, the misreporting probabilities are
small indicating that senders truthfully answer the WVS question. Incorporation of
these probabilities in a likelihood equation is a straightforward application of the re-
sults of Hausman, Abrevaya, and Scott-Morton (1998) and can be found in appendix
A.2 of our paper.
Specification 5 of table 2 presents regression results for the probit model with mis-
reporting. Both θ101 and θ
01
1 associated with senders’ experimental decisions y
E
i are
not significantly different from zero, indicating that the experimental decision did not
lead senders to systematically misreport their true answer to the WVS trust question.
To test for overall misreporting, we computed a log-likelihood ratio test comparing
18
the probit model with and without misreporting (specifications 4 and 5).17 The test
value of 5.38 with 10% critical value of 7.02 does not reject the null hypothesis of no
misreporting. Both sets of results suggest that senders in our experiment truthfully
answered the WVS trust question, which means that allowing for the possibility that
subjects misreport their answers is not sufficient to reconcile both measures. This sug-
gests that the WVS trust question captures a notion of trust which differs from the
notion of trust captured in our economic experiment.
4 Results on Trustworthiness
We follow GLSS and measure trustworthiness as the return ratio, defined as the amount
returned divided by the amount available to return. In our experiment, the available
amount to return equals the amount received multiplied by two, plus the experimen-
tal endowment of 500 CentERpoints. Responders were asked to play the strategy
method by which they decide how much they will give back for each of the 11 possible
amounts they can receive from the sender. This implies that we observe a sequence{
yRa ∈ [0, 1] |a ∈ {0, 50, ..., 500}
}
for each responder, where yRa denotes the return ratio
when receiving a CentERpoints from the sender. The main advantage of the return
ratio is that it is automatically scaled, which controls for the fact that receivers can
send more simply because the total available amount increases with a. Figure 2 shows
a boxplot of the return ratio for all 11 possible amounts. The thick line inside each
box represents the median, the top and bottom of the boxes represent the 75th and
25th percentiles while the top and lower whiskers represent respectively the maximal
and minimal values of the distribution.18 The two important features of this figure are
that the ratio 1) monotonically increases and is concave in the amounts received, 2) a
significant fraction of the responders return nothing (especially in low categories) while
practically no responder returns the entire possible amount.
Did it pay to trust? Figure 3 presents density estimates of senders returns of
17We use the test proposed by Andrews (2001) to deal with the fact that the probabilities of
misreporting rest on the boundary of the parameter space under the null hypothesis. Computation
of the test requires that the critical values of the log-likelihood ratio test be simulated. We report
critical values based on 1000 simulations. See Andrews for further details.
18The minimal and maximal values are corrected to the presence of extreme outliers.
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investments in trust.19 Each line represents the estimated distribution of returns for a
given number of CentERpoints sent. If responders return to senders exactly what they
sent, the return on investment is 0. If responders do not return anything to the senders,
the return is -1. Apart from the distribution of returns when 50 CentERpoints are sent,
all distributions have roughly the same shape. The common finding in laboratory trust
experiments is that trust barely pays, as responders return to senders what they have
sent (Camerer, 2003). Our results reconfirm these findings. We find that the median
return on investment is slightly above 0 for every amount sent. Furthermore, the
probability of getting nothing back from a receiver (a return ratio of -1) is not zero.
The individual level analysis of the return ratio is based on the following Tobit
model (Amemiya, 1984)
y∗Rai = x
r′
i η+γ1a+ γ2a
2 + εri i = 1, 2, ..., N (6)
yRai = y
∗R
ai if y
∗R
ai > 0 (7)
= 0 if y∗Rai ≤ 0 (8)
Equation (6) describes the unconstrained trustworthiness propensity of responders.
This propensity is modelled as depending on a vector of background characteristics
xri , an unobservable component ε
r
i , and a vector of unknown population parameters η.
The quadratic form in a is added to capture the increasing monotonicity in amounts
returned observed in the data.20 Equations (7) and (8) describe the censoring rule which
allows responders with extremely low trustworthiness propensities to return nothing
with positive probability.
The estimation results are presented in table 3. The first specification includes
standard background characteristics of the responder, reported trust experience, their
beliefs about what they expect to receive from the sender (RTHINK),21 and responders’
answers to the WVS trust question. The second specification removes the WVS trust
19These returns are computed as the (amount received - amount sent) / amount sent.
20We have estimated a less restrictive specification with dummy variables for each a category.
Results were numerically identical to those presented above.
21RTHINK is coded from 0 to 10, where each unit is worth 50 CentERpoints.
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answers while the third specification adds answers to the trust question and responders’
beliefs. We compare the first three specifications using log-likelihood ratio tests. The
extended specification which includes interaction terms is clearly preferred to the first
two specifications.22 Accordingly, our analysis below will focus on the results of the
extended specification.
As could be seen from the raw data in figure 2, amounts returned monotonically
increase and are concave in a, the amounts received. This is also reflected in the Tobit
estimates, where the first order term γ1 is positive and the second order term γ2 is
negative, both significant at the 1% level. The life cycle evolution of reciprocity is
captured by the parameters of RETIRED, AGE, AGESQ, and the three interaction
terms. The change in the trustworthiness propensity which follows from a change in
age is given by (standard errors in parenthesis)
∂R∗ia
∂AGEi
= 2× 0.000032
(0.000017)
AGEi − 0.0014
(0.0005)
WVSi − 0.0003
(0.0000)
RTHINKi (9)
We first solve the for turning points, which we define as the age around which the
sign of the derivative changes, and compare them with those of trust found in the
previous section. Because of the interaction terms, computation of the turning points
requires that we fix the values of WVS and RTHINK. We can get an overall picture
by evaluating equation (9) at the sample means of WVS and RTHINK. We find that
trustworthiness reaches its lowest level when individuals reach the age of 30 years, and
increases beyond that. These results differ remarkably from the life cycle evolution of
trust discussed in the previous section. There, we found that trust increases until the
age of 30 and decreases beyond that. The last section of the paper discusses a possible
explanation of this result. We next evaluated the age turning points for those who
report trusting others (WVS=1) and those who do not (WVS=0). The age profile of
individuals who state they do not trust others reaches a low at 21 years of age, while
it reaches a low at 43 years of age for those who declare trusting others.
In the previous section, we found that the relationship between trust and educa-
tion was inverted U shape, with subjects without a secondary degree and those with
22The log-likelihood ration test value is 19.9 when comparing specifications 1 against 3, and 59.14
when comparing specifications 2 and 3. Both are significant at the 1% level.
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university degrees displaying relatively less trustful behavior. The relation between
education and trustworthiness is very different. Less educated subjects (the omitted
category) return significantly more than educated subjects, all degrees confounded.
Moreover, the parameter estimates suggests a U shape relationship, with individuals
with university degrees being more trustworthy that subjects with technical education
degrees.
The effect of gender also distinguishes trust from trustworthiness. While gender was
found to have no impact on trust, we find here that men return on average significantly
less than women.
One of the interesting findings of GLSS was that answers to the WVS trust question
did not correlate with experimental trust but correlated rather well with the return ra-
tio. In our experiment, we also find that subjects who trust more others are also more
trustworthy. However, some of the issues raised in section 3.1.1 concerning the predic-
tive power of stated trust questions may also apply here, although it is less clear from
the results in this section whether the underlying process determining trustworthiness
and trust are as similar.
We have shown in the previous section that subjects’ beliefs were important deter-
minants of trust. Here, beliefs of responders also play an important role in determining
trustworthiness. Responders who believed they would receive more had higher average
return ratios. To gain some insights on the importance of beliefs on trustworthiness,
we estimated our extended specification omitting beliefs. Specification 4 in table 3
shows the result of this regression. The only notable change is that trustworthiness
of those who report trusting others continues to decline with age while it no longer
declines for those who report not trusting others. A log-likelihood ratio test (value of
85.88, significant at the 1% level) confirms that omitting beliefs substantially lowers
the predictive fit of the model.
We end by noting that some individual characteristics have no effect on trustwor-
thiness. This is the case of subjects’ income, whether they work or not, their retirement
status, religion, and their lifetime trust experience. Interestingly, none of these char-
acteristics were found to explain experimental trust.
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It is well known that the Tobit model is
sensitive to the distributional assumption placed on the unobserved component (Newey,
1987). An alternative estimator which relaxes most distributional assumptions of the
Tobit model is the Symmetrically Trimmed Least Squares estimator (STLS) of Powell
(1986). Contrary to Tobit, the semiparametric STLS estimator does not require nor-
mality and is robust to (bounded) heteroscedasticity of unknown form in εri . All our
specifications were estimated using the STLS estimator (results are presented in table
4) . Hausman (1978) specification tests never reject the null hypothesis of normality
and homoscedasticity of the error terms on which the Tobit model rests.
5 Results on Participation
The major impediment experimenters must overcome to test for participation bias is
that they generally do not observe non-participants. In our experiment, we observe
both the decision to participate and the characteristics of non-participants. This allows
us to address the following issues 1) whether observed or unobserved factors are more
important determinants of participation and 2) if participation is based on unobserv-
able characteristics, are these related to experimental outcomes? The first question
addresses the current belief in experimental economics which suggests that unobserved
factors such as preferences for risk and money are more likely to explain participation
in the experiment than the observed characteristics of subjects (Camerer and Hogarth,
1999). The second question directly touches the issue of participation bias, by which
actions of participants are not representative of the population at large.
The most natural framework to approach both questions is that developed by Heck-
man (1978). We model participation as being driven both by observed and unobserved
factors, the latter having the potential to affect the outcomes of interest and cause
participation bias. Let di ∈ {0, 1} be an indicator of participation in the experiment
and let an individuals’ unobserved latent propensity to participate be
d∗i = x
j
iδ + θ RATIOi + ε
d
i for j = r, t
where xji is the conditioning vector entering the trust and reciprocity models, ε
d
i is
an unobservable determinant of participation assumed to be drawn from a N(0, 1)
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distribution, and (δ,θ) are unknown parameters. A general feature of these models is
the requirement of a valid exclusion restriction for nonparametric identification of the
participation bias. In practical terms, we need a variable which affects participation
but does not directly affect either experimental and survey measures used in this paper.
Our exclusion restriction is the variable RATIO, which is computed as proportion of
questionnaires completed by panel members in the three months which preceded our
experiment. This variable directly measures the participation propensity of subjects
when participation is uncorrelated with financial outcomes.23 The dependance between
the experimental outcomes and the participation decisions is captured by the amount
of correlation between εdi and the unobservable components determining trust (see
equation (1)) and trustworthiness (see equation (6)). We replicated the estimations of
sections 2 and 4 by separately estimating an ordered probit, a binary probit model,
and a Tobit model, along with the participation decision. We allow for potential
participation bias by letting εdi be correlated with the unobserved component of each
experimental decision.
Most of the parameters entering the systematic part of the participation propensity
were insignificant, confirming the conjecture that participation is mostly explained by
unobserved characteristics of subjects.24 One notable exception was income which has
a positive and significant effect on participation, which rules out participation based on
low opportunity costs. The presence of participation bias can be determined by testing
the statistical significance of the correlation coefficients between εdi and the unobserved
components of the trust and trustworthiness measures used in this paper. We find that
none of the three correlations are significant at the 10% level, a clear indication that the
unobserved characteristics determining participation in the experiment do not correlate
with the experimental decisions.
23CP members are not paid to participate in the panel.
24Results for trust and trustworthiness are virtually identical to those reported in the text. All but
one parameter entering the trust propensity was significant (see text above). Results are available
upon request.
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6 Discussion and conclusions
The literature has identified trust and trustworthiness as important factors of economic
performance and growth. Understanding the determinants of these at the societal
level is important yet, not well documented. The majority of the existing empirical
evidence relies on one of two complementary methodologies. Survey methods on one
hand collect responses of heterogeneous samples, at the expense of having to rely on
hypothetical and self-reported measures. On the other hand laboratory experiments
offer the possibility to collect data on the actual behavior of subjects at the expense
of collecting this data for a very special subset of the population of interest.
This paper presented results from a computerized experiment whose participants
were randomly drawn from the Dutch population. This approach allowed us to combine
the strengths of experiments and survey data collection methods.
One of the key findings of this paper is that background characteristics of subjects,
mainly their age and education levels, do play an important role in determining trust
and trustworthiness, although they affect trust and trustworthiness in very different
ways. Our results reconfirmed the existing inverted U shape relation between trust
and age, with trust increasing until the age of 30 and decreasing beyond that. On the
other hand, we find that the relation between trustworthiness and age is U shaped, with
trustworthiness decreasing until the age of 30, and rising again beyond that point. This
raises the question of why do the young and elderly trust less but are more trustworthy
than middle aged individuals? One explanation is that individuals who trust the most
take for granted that the average individual in society will do the same. Hence, when
someone places trust in them, they are less likely to be surprised by this action and
will not place a premium as high on rewarding trust as would individuals who trust
others less.
The education patterns are also very different. We find an inverted-U shape relation
between education and trust, and an U shape relationship between education and
trustworthiness. Such opposite influences of background characteristics are puzzling
insofar as it is typically assumed that trust and trustworthiness go hand in hand,
which would suggest that both are determined in similar ways. Reconciling the age
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and education patterns of trust and trustworthiness is an interesting topic for future
research.
An additional contribution of the paper is that we provided a new way to compare
experimental and survey trust measures. The literature has up till now assessed the
validity of survey trust questions by testing whether or not they predicted well experi-
mental trust. One of the main messages of the paper is that this method of validation
has been given too much attention, primarily because the predictive power of survey
measures is intimately linked to the sample used, the amount of background informa-
tion available on the subjects, and the experimental design. Our analysis has shown
that by carefully selecting samples and designs, experimenters increase their odds of
finding either a low or high predictive power of the survey trust measure. Thus, despite
that contrary to the existing literature our survey trust measure predicts well trust in
our experiment, we do not take this as evidence validating the use of survey trust
questions. It is important to note that the problems with prediction are only relevant
if predicting experimental trust with survey trust is what experimenters are trying to
achieve. In general, prediction is useful if applied to an object which has a clear inter-
est in being predicted well. Trust measured in an experiment is an abstract quantity
whose main purpose is to extract from it useful characteristics of the population under
study. Viewed in this way, it is not clear whether the emphasis on predicting its value
by other trust measures is in general warranted.
As our paper focuses on investigating the determinants of trust and trustworthiness,
it follows quite naturally that a more convincing comparison of both measures could
be achieved by comparing whether experimental and survey measures have the same
informational content. On these grounds, the differences between both trust measures
are stark. We found that education has an inverted-U shape relation with experimental
trust while it does not correlate at all with answers to the WVS trust question. In
contrast, religion correlates well with answers to the WVS trust question but not at
all with experimental trust.
We have also examined possible explanations for the differences between both mea-
sures. The two prominent explanations are that subjects either misreport their answers
to the WVS question, or that the question simply captures a different notion of trust
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than the one which is captured in the experiment. We do not find any evidence sug-
gesting that these differences are due to subjects misreporting their answers to the
survey trust question. As surveys remain more accessible than nation-wide laboratory
experiments, it seems worthwhile for researchers interested in making cross-country
comparisons to design new survey questions which will narrow the gap with experi-
mental measures.
Finally, this paper made one of the first tests of participation bias in an economic
experiment. We have not found any evidence suggesting the presence of participation
bias in our experiment. In our view, this is a reassuring finding for experimental
economics.
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A Econometric appendix
A.1 Minimum distance test
Define σWV S and σE respectively as the standard deviation of εWV S and εE. Under
the assumptions of the parametric models, the probit estimator provides consistent
estimates of βE/σE while the ordered probit model provides consistent estimates of
βWV S/σWV S. The comparison of both ratios is complicated by the fact that the exper-
imental variance is partly under experimental control (see discussion in section 3.2).
It is possible to get ride of σE by normalizing say the kth component to 1, which is
equivalent to dividing the parameter vector by the kth component βEk /σ
E. Under this
normalization,25 the following transformed vector
{
βE
1
βE
k
, ...,
βE
k−1
βE
k
, 1,
βE
k+1
βE
k
, ...,
βE
K
βE
k
}
is inde-
pendent of σE. One can perform a similar division for parameter estimates from the
probit model on the WVS trust question and obtain a second vector of parameters, this
time independent of σWV S. In what follows, we use ξE and ξWV S as shorthand nota-
tions for the vectors of the ordered and binary probit models excluding the constant and
the normalized kth term.26 Under the null hypothesis that the effects of background
characteristics are the same, both sets of estimates would equal each other.
Our test statistic has the following familiar quadratic form
N
(
ξ̂E−ξ̂WV S
)
′
W−1
(
ξ̂E−ξ̂WV S
)
(10)
where W represents the covariance matrix of the difference between both parameter
vectors. Below we show that the test statistic above follows a chi square distribution
with K − 2 degrees of freedom.
We briefly sketch here a minimum distance test for observable characteristics. We
will use EN to denote sample expectations and E for corresponding population expec-
tations. The estimated parameters solve
ξ̂E = argmax
ξ
EN
[
LE (ξ)
]
ξ̂WV S = argmax
ξ
EN
[
LWV S (ξ)
]
25This normalization requires that βk 6= 0
26The constant term parameter is generally not separately identified from the threshold parameters
in both the binary and ordered probit models. Given their values are functions of ad hoc threshold
assumptions, they are not used in computation of the test.
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where LWV S (ξ) denotes the binary probit likelihood function and LE (ξ) denotes the
likelihood function of the ordered probit where the threshold parameters have been
concentrated out. We will use the notation Lξ (ξ) and Lξξ′ (ξ) to respectively denote
the scores and the matrix of second derivatives of each function. It follows that
√
N
 ξ̂E − ξ0
ξ̂WV S − ξ0
 = −

 {EN [LEξξ′ (ξ)]}−1 0
0
{
EN
[
LWV Sξξ′
(
ξ
)]}−1

√
N
 EN [LEξ (ξ0)]
EN
[
LWV Sξ (ξ0)
]

+ op (1) (11)
where every element of ξ lies in between corresponding elements of ξ̂E and ξ0. Under
appropriate regularity conditions (Newey and McFadden, 1994), Both E
[
LEξ (ξ0)
]
and
E
[
LWV Sξ (ξ0)
]
are zero vectors and
EN
[
LEξξ′
(
ξ
)] U→ E [LEξξ′ (ξ0)] ≡ H1
EN
[
LWV Sξξ′
(
ξ
)] U→ E [LWV Sξξ′ (ξ0)] ≡ H2
where
U→ denotes uniform convergence. It follows that (11) converges in distribution
to
N
 0
0
 ;
 H−11 0
0 H−12
 JE,E JE,WV S
JWV S,E JWV S,WV S
 H−11 0
0 H−12

= N
 0
0
 ;
 V11 V12
V21 V22

where J i,j = E
[
Liξ (ξ0)L
j
ξ (ξ0)
]
for i, j = E,WV S. Finally, we get
√
N
(
ξ̂E − ξ̂WV S
)
d→ N (0;W)
where W ≡ V11 +V22 −V12 −V21. Hence, equation (10) follows a chi square distri-
bution with K − 2 degrees of freedom. We compute the test statistic (10) by replacing
W with a sample average evaluated at either ξ̂E or ξ̂WV S, both equivalent under the
null hypothesis.
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A.2 Probit model with misclassification
Following Hausman, Abrevaya, and Scott-Morton (1998), the probability that a subject
states that he trusts others is given by
Pr
(
yWV Si = 1|xti , yEi
)
= α10
(
yEi
)
+
(
1− α10
(
yEi
)− α01 (yEi )) · Pr (T ∗i > 0|xti) (12)
where
(
α01
(
yEi
)
, α10
(
yEi
))
and T ∗i are defined in section 3. It follows that in the
absence of misreporting errors (α01
(
yEi
)
= α10
(
yEi
)
= 0), equation (12) collapses to
standard binary probit model (Maddala, 1983). The likelihood function of the binary
choice model with misreporting is constructed using the choice probabilities (12).
B Instructions
The first 3 screens of the experiment are the same for both senders and responders.
Italic notes in the translation are comments by the authors.
• First screen:
This experiment is a research project of researchers from *** and ***.
With this experiment you can make real money in terms of CentERpoints.
You receive from the researchers additional CentERpoints (besides the usual
telephone allowance).
• Second screen:
During this experiment you will be matched with another member of the panel.
You will not know who this person is, both of you will stay anonymous.
Both of you receive 500 CentERpoints. Then the experiments starts.
One of you has the possibility to send a share of this away. The amount of points
sent will be doubled and given to the other person. The other person has then the
opportunity to send a share of the own total amount back. The amount which
is sent back will not be doubled.
How many points you finally earn depends therefore on your decision and the
decision of the person you are matched with. You will be randomly assigned to
your role.
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• Third screen:
We now give you the chance to indicate whether you want to participate. If
you decide not to participate, the experiment will end immediately. You will
receive the usual telephone reimbursement. If you continue you will receive the
500 CentERpoints.
Do you want to continue?
© Yes
© No
Subjects who choose to participate were then randomly assigned to their roles.
Senders and receivers had to read decision screens tailored to their roles.
Senders
• Fourth screen:
You have been matched with another member of the panel. Like you, this person
received 500 CentERpoints. You can send a share of your 500 CentERpoints.
The panel member with whom you are matched with receives the amount you
sent multiplied by 2. Then, this person has the opportunity to send a share of
the own total amount back (without knowing who you are). The amount which
this person sends back to you will not be doubled.
How many points do you want to give?
(The sender could send one out of 11 possible amounts.)
© 0 the other person receives additionally nothing and has therefore 500 and
you remain with 500 points.
...
© 500 the other person receives additionally 1000 and has therefore 1500 in
total and you remain with 0 points.
• Fifth screen:
(was depending on the decision taken at the fourth screen, here as example ”200”)
You decided to send 200 points.
The panel member you are matched with receives therefore 400 additional Cen-
tERpoints.
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He or she has therefore in total 900 CentERpoints.
You remain with 300 CentERpoints.
How many points do you think the other panel member with whom you are
matched with will send to you?
(Participants had to type in a number. In this example in the range of [0,900].)
• Sixth screen:
This experiment is done with some panel members. Half of them interact in the
same position as you. They can send a share of their 500 CentERpoints which is
doubled and received by a person of the other position.
How many points do you think those panel members have sent?
(The sender could indicate one out of 11 possible amounts from 0 to 500).
Responders
• Fourth screen:
You have been matched with another member of the panel. Like you, this person
received 500 CentERpoints. This person is asked to send you a share from their
own 500 CentERpoints. You will receive the amount of those points the other
person has sent multiplied by 2.
For example, if the other person sends 100 CentERpoints, you will receive 200
CentERpoints. Together with the 500 points you begin with, you will have in
total 700 CentERpoints.
From this amount you can return a share. The amount you send will not be
doubled.
• Fifth screen:
As we do not know now how many CentERpoints the other panel member with
whom you are matched with has sent we present all possible amounts this per-
son could send to you. The amount you actually receive is written in the next
column. Please indicate in the last column what amount you would return for
each possible amount sent.
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After the real decision of the other person is known the amount you indicated
for this particular decision will be realized. The amount you will return will be
deducted from your total amount.
(The responder had to indicate for each of 11 possible amounts the sender could
send what he would return. The table was designed as follows:)
If the other sends: I receive: In total with the In this case I return:
500 CentERpoints:
0 0 500
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
500 1000 1500
• Sixth screen:
How many points do you expect the panel member with whom you are matched
with has sent to you?
(The responder could indicate one out of 11 possible amounts from 0 to 500.)
After these screens the experiment was over. Nobody could go backwards and both
senders and responders were asked the following post-experimental questions:
• Seventh screen (Trust experience question):
The last two questions are about trust in general. This question is about your
own trust experience.
If you trust is your trust generally rewarded or exploited?
Choose the number which is closest to your answer.
always rewarded 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 always exploited.
(Participants had to type in a number between 1 and 7).
• Eight screen (WVS trust question):
Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you
cannot be too careful in dealing with people?
1.) Most people can be trusted.
2.) You have to be very careful.
3.) I do not know.
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S R Not played
Mean StD Mean StD Mean StD
GENDER 0.46 0.5 0.46 0.5 0.43 0.5 Dummy, 1 if Man
AGE 42.66 15.55 43.98 15.67 53.79 16.55 Age
GR INCP 2580.38 6133.47 1916.28 3289.66 2356.90 3584.27 Gross Personal Monthly Income (Guilders)
GR INCH 4175.59 7526.39 3342.07 4313.76 4302.52 6593.33 Gross Household Monthly Income (Guilders)
HSIZE 2.27 1.12 2.53 1.33 2.17 1.23 Household Size
NCHILD 0.55 0.92 0.75 1.16 0.4 1.06 Number of Children in household
PARTNER 0.72 0.45 0.78 0.42 0.76 0.43 Partner is living in the household
LOWEDUC 0.043 0.204 0.076 0.266 0.143 0.354 Dummy, 1 if Low education level
SECONDEG 0.388 0.488 0.390 0.489 0.381 0.492 Dummy, 1 if Secondary degree
TRAINDEG 0.449 0.449 0.448 0.499 0.357 0.485 Dummy, 1 if Training degree
UNIVDEG 0.119 0.325 0.085 0.279 0.119 0.329 Dummy, 1 if University degree
WORK 0.591 0.493 0.511 0.501 0.429 0.501 Dummy, 1 if Labor Work
RETIRED 0.130 0.337 0.148 0.356 0.262 0.445 Dummy, 1 if Retired
HHEAD 0.637 0.482 0.609 0.488 0.667 0.477 Dummy, 1 if Head of household
CATHOLIC 0.297 0.458 0.349 0.478 0.309 0.468 Dummy, 1 if Catholic religion
PROTEST 0.210 0.408 0.265 0.442 0.191 0.397 Dummy, 1 if Protestant religion
OTHERS 0.493 0.501 0.386 0.488 0.500 0.506 Dummy, 1 if Atheist or Other religion
WVS 0.533 0.500 0.488 0.498 − − Dummy, 1 if Yes to WVS trust question
TRUSTEXP 3.16 1.18 3.45 1.31 − − 1-7, 1 if Always rewarded 7, Always disappointed
Median time∗ 3.29 5.93 1.28 Minutes taken to play the experiment
Nobs 276 223 42
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics. *Median time played is computed from the time subjects logged in the CentERdata network.
34
Experimental trust Stated trust (WVS)
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coef. Std. Coef. Std. Coef. Std. Coef. Std. Coef. Std.
CONSTANT −2.018∗∗ 0.736 −0.314 0.681 −1.828∗∗∗ 0.687 −3.069∗∗∗ 0.838 −3.787 1.424
GENDER 0.182 0.133 0.229∗ 0.134 0.217 0.160 −0.186 0.181 −0.335 0.244
AGE 0.067∗∗ 0.031 0.052∗ 0.029 0.060∗∗∗ 0.031 0.067∗ 0.037 0.071 0.051
AGE SQ/1000 −0.897∗∗ 0.367 −0.662∗∗ 0.335 −0.803∗∗ 0.349 −0.909∗∗ 0.435 −1.026∗ 0.589
RETIRED −0.193 0.374 0.271 0.293 −0.251 0.287 0.528 0.411 0.707 0.535
SECONDEG 0.908∗∗∗ 0.396 0.626∗ 0.308 0.845∗∗∗ 0.318 0.518 0.422 0.504 0.578
TRAINDEG 0.809∗∗ 0.404 0.589∗ 0.312 0.761∗∗ 0.332 0.394 0.436 0.446 0.602
UNIVDEG 0.729 0.457 0.716∗ 0.361 0.678 0.395 0.522 0.499 0.337 0.678
WORK −0.219 0.193 −0.089 0.185 −0.189 0.208 −0.290 0.243 −0.451 0.373
LN(GR INCP) 0.024 0.026 0.007 0.028 0.019 0.039 0.034 0.038 0.044 0.053
NUMCHILD −0.118∗ 0.064 −0.043 0.066 −0.129 0.099 0.105 0.102 0.121 0.146
CATHOLIC 0.101 0.170 0.002 0.165 0.149 0.171 −0.476∗∗ 0.211 −0.567∗ 0.290
PROTEST −0.016 0.164 −0.109 0.149 0.042 0.208 −0.524∗∗ 0.227 −0.699∗∗ 0.355
TRUSTEXP 0.045 0.059 0.090 0.065 −0.032 0.082 0.665∗∗ 0.085 0.905∗∗∗ 0.205
STHINK 0.003∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.003∗∗∗ 0.000
SMEANS 0.423∗∗∗ 0.061 0.433∗∗∗ 0.044
WVS 0.362∗∗ 0.169
θ100 −3.467 1.621
θ101 0.387 0.233
θ010 −1.311 1.881
θ011 −1.119 1.583
Log-Likelihood −406.42 −520.06 −403.58 −150.8 −148.11
Table 2: Sender Results. Specifications (1) to (3) refer to the ordered probit model, columns (4) and (5) to the binary probit model.
The significance of parameters is based on robust standard errors and bootstrap empirical quantiles of the t-statistics (1000 repetitions),
N=276.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coef. Std. Coef. Std. Coef. Std. Coef. Std.
CONSTANT −0.042 0.032 −0.071∗∗ 0.032 −0.076∗∗∗ 0.035 −0.056 0.035
γ1 0.087
∗∗∗ 0.004 0.0875∗∗∗ 0.004 0.087∗∗∗ 0.004 0.088∗∗∗ 0.004
γ2 −0.005∗∗∗ 0.0003 −0.005∗∗∗ 0.0003 −0.0045∗∗∗ 0.0003 −0.005∗∗∗ 0.0003
GENDER −0.018∗∗∗ 0.007 −0.019∗∗ 0.007 −0.017∗∗∗ 0.0068 −0.008 0.007
AGE −0.002∗ 0.001 −0.001 0.001 −0.0014 0.0014 0.0003 0.001
AGESQ/1000 0.033∗∗∗ 0.017 0.019 0.016 0.032∗ 0.017 0.004 0.017
RETIRED −0.004 0.015 −0.007 0.015 0.0052 0.014 0.017 0.015
SECONDEG −0.053∗∗∗ 0.012 −0.060∗∗∗ 0.012 −0.054∗∗∗ 0.012 −0.052∗∗∗ 0.012
TRAINDEG −0.065∗∗∗ 0.012 −0.067∗∗∗ 0.012 −0.067∗∗∗ 0.012 −0.062∗∗∗ 0.012
UNIVDEG −0.053∗∗∗ 0.015 −0.057∗∗∗ 0.015 −0.058∗∗∗ 0.015 −0.058∗∗∗ 0.015
WORK 0.016∗ 0.009 0.011 0.009 0.019∗∗ 0.0089 0.013 0.009
LN(GR INCP) 0.0006 0.0011 0.002 0.001 0.0001 0.0011 0.0002 0.001
CATHOLIC −0.009 0.007 −0.009 0.007 −0.0062 0.0073 −0.002 0.007
PROTEST 0.006 0.008 0.004 0.008 0.0051 0.0076 −0.0005 0.008
WVS 0.045∗∗∗ 0.007 0.1035∗∗∗ 0.022 0.149∗∗∗ 0.021
TRUSTEXP −0.003 0.003 0.0064∗∗ 0.0027 −0.017 0.009 −0.011 0.009
RTHINK 0.013∗∗∗ 0.001 0.013∗∗∗ 0.001 0.0255∗∗∗ 0.0044
AGE×TRUSTEXP 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002
AGE×WVS −0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0005 −0.002∗∗∗ 0.0005
AGE×RTHINK −0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0000
σ2 0.144∗∗∗ 0.002 0.021∗∗∗ 0.0006 0.0207∗∗∗ 0.0006 0.021∗∗∗ 0.0006
Log-Likelihood 936.52 916.75 946.47 903.53
***: 1% Level. **: 5% Level. *: 10% Level
Table 3: Responder Results - Tobit estimator. N = 2453.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coef. Std. Coef. Std. Coef. Std. Coef. Std.
CONSTANT −0.039 0.033 −0.069∗∗ 0.033 −0.042 0.036 −0.043 0.037
γ1 0.079
∗∗∗ 0.004 0.079∗∗∗ 0.005 0.079∗∗∗ 0.005 0.079∗∗∗ 0.005
γ2 −0.004∗∗∗ 0.0004 −0.004∗∗∗ 0.0004 −0.004∗∗∗ 0.0004 −0.004∗∗∗ 0.0004
GENDER −0.013∗∗ 0.007 −0.015∗∗ 0.007 −0.014∗∗ 0.007 −0.003 0.006
AGE −0.001 0.001 0.0002 0.001 −0.0006 0.001 0.002 0.001
AGESQ/1000 0.017 0.017 0.004 0.016 0.009 0.018 −0.021 0.018
RETIRED −0.002 0.017 −0.005 0.017 0.006 0.017 0.021 0.017
SECONDEG −0.050∗∗∗ 0.016 −0.059∗∗∗ 0.016 −0.053∗∗∗ 0.015 −0.045∗∗ 0.016
TRAINDEG −0.064∗∗∗ 0.016 −0.065∗∗∗ 0.016 −0.066∗∗∗ 0.015 −0.057∗∗ 0.016
UNIVDEG −0.040∗∗∗ 0.018 −0.045∗∗∗ 0.018 −0.0469∗∗ 0.018 −0.043∗∗ 0.018
WORK 0.012 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.0128 0.008 0.008 0.008
LN(GR INCP) 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 −0.0005 0.001 −0.0006 0.001
CATHOLIC −0.014∗∗ 0.007 −0.012 0.007 −0.013 0.007 −0.008 0.007
PROTEST 0.010 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.012 0.008 0.004 0.008
WVS 0.042∗∗∗ 0.007 0.086∗∗∗ 0.020 0.129∗∗∗ 0.021
TRUSTEXP −0.001 0.003 0.0082∗∗ 0.003 −0.025∗∗ 0.009 −0.017∗ 0.009
RTHINK 0.012∗∗∗ 0.001 0.012∗∗∗ 0.001 0.022∗∗∗ 0.0046
AGE×TRUSTEXP 0.0006∗∗ 0.0002 0.0004∗∗ 0.0002
AGE×WVS −0.0011∗∗ 0.0005 −0.002∗∗∗ 0.0005
AGE×RTHINK −0.0002∗∗ 0.0000
Hausman χ2 test 3.106 2.762 15.656 19.234
***: 1% Level. **: 5% Level. *: 10% Level
Table 4: Responder Results - Symmetrically Trimmed Least Squares estimator. N = 2453.
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Figure 1: Distribution of experimental trust.
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Figure 2: Return ratio of responders for each units received, strategy method.
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Figure 3: Estimated density of potential returns on investments in trust for each
amount sent. Gaussian kernel density estimation. Rate of return computed as (amount
returned - amount sent) / amount sent. The rate of return is infinity when the amount
sent is zero and is not plotted here.
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